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Abstract—Similarly to elsewhere on the Internet, practical
security in the Internet of Things (IoT) is achieved by combining
an array of mechanisms, at work at all layers of the protocol
stack, in system software, and in hardware. Standard protocols
such as Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS 1.2) and
Transport Layer Security (TLS 1.2) are often recommended
to secure communications to/from IoT devices. Recently, the
TLS 1.3 standard was released and DTLS 1.3 is in the final
stages of standardization. In this paper, we give an overview
of version 1.3 of these protocols, and we provide the first
experimental comparative performance analysis of different im-
plementations and various configurations of these protocols, on
real IoT devices based on low-power microcontrollers. We show
how different implementations lead to different compromises.
We measure and compare bytes-over-the-air, memory footprint,
and energy consumption. We show that, when DTLS/TLS 1.3
requires more resources than DTLS/TLS 1.2, this additional
overhead is quite reasonable. We also observe that, in some
configurations, DTLS/TLS 1.3 actually decreases overhead and
resource consumption. All in all, our study indicates that there
is still room to optimize the existing implementations of these
protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet of Things (IoT) deployment unfolds, the
list of attacks against IoT devices gets longer. To address the
security concerns, governmental institutions, industry groups,
and researchers have been publishing recommendations and
guidelines for securing IoT devices. Examples include the
‘Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT’ [9] published
by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)
and the ‘Core Cybersecurity Feature Baseline for Securable
IoT Devices: A Starting Point for IoT Device Manufactur-
ers’ [14] published by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST). Renowned security expert Bruce
Schneier [24] published a long list of available guidelines and
it is immediately clear that there is no shortage on advice for
IoT manufacturers and embedded developers.
While these sets of guidelines vary in the level of detail,
they all ask for communication security to be integrated into
IoT devices. Over the years, Transport Layer Security (TLS)
has become the most widely used (and the most carefully
scrutinized) approach to secure data in transit over the Internet.
To no surprise, some IoT security guidelines actually mandate
the use of TLS to provide end-to-end communication integrity,
confidentiality and authenticity. Version 1.2 of TLS [31] has so
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far been the recommended standard for securing protocols op-
erating over TCP, along with its UDP-based variant Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS).
Recently, TLS 1.3 [17] was published, and DTLS 1.3 is
in the final stages of standardization. A reasonable question
is thus: How appropriate is TLS 1.3 for IoT? In particular,
we focus here on resource-constrained IoT devices, such as
described in RFC 7228 [6]. These devices are based on
microcontrollers – for instance Arm Cortex M-based micro-
controllers – on which run real-time operating systems, such
as FreeRTOS, RIOT, Micrium’s µC/OS, Mbed OS, among oth-
ers [11]. Compared to computers that run full-blown operating
systems, such as Linux, constrained IoT devices use a fraction
of the power and are equipped with RAM and Flash sizes in
the kilobyte range.
Related work – There is so far surprisingly little work eval-
uating DTLS/TLS 1.3 on IoT hardware. The only prior work
we know of is [7], which evaluates a preliminary draft version
of TLS 1.3 on STM32-based microcontrollers. Compared to
[7], our paper analyzes the final TLS 1.3 standard, as well as
the latest version of DTLS 1.3.
Open source implementation of DTLS 1.3 we know of so
far are limited to a partial implementation in Go [4] and
a prototype in Mozilla NSS [16], neither of which fit in
an embedded network stack applicable to microcontrollers.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first
experimental study evaluating and comparing DTLS/TLS 1.2
with DTLS/TLS 1.3, on low-power microcontrollers.
Paper contributions – The main contributions of this paper
are the following:
• we provide a comparative overview of DTLS/TLS 1.3
and 1.2 protocol specifications;
• we provide the first open source implementation of the
DTLS 1.3 protocol targeting small embedded systems;
• we conduct experiments on IoT microcontrollers, com-
paring the performance of different configuration and
multiple implementations of DTLS/TLS 1.3 and 1.2;
• we measure and compare the footprint of secure commu-
nication solutions in terms of bytes over-the-air, RAM
and Flash memory requirements, energy consumption;
• we overview next steps and optimization potential to-
wards lower footprint with IoT communication security
at the transport layer and above.
Paper organization – This paper is organized as follows:
In Section II-III provides necessary background on TLS,
DTLS and overviews protocol differences between 1.3 and
1.2 versions. In Section IV we describe our experimental test
setup. In Section V we present the results of our comparative
performance evaluation, based on memory, traffic overhead,
and energy measurements. Then, in Section VI we discuss
perspectives, before we conclude.
II. BACKGROUND
TLS is a communication security protocol standardized by
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Provided two
end points A and B can communicate over a network, TLS
establishes and maintains a secure communication channel
between A and B. TLS guarantees the integrity of the data
flowing through this channel, as well as its authenticity, and
its confidentiality.
TLS Handshake. In a first phase, called the handshake layer,
TLS specifies an authentication and key exchange protocol.
The handshake results in the authentication of A and B (using
asymmetric or pre-shared keys) and the establishement of a
master secret known only to A and B: a symmetric key. In
this context, the end point initiating the handshake is called
the client, while the other end point is called the server. Fig.
1 shows client-server control message exchanges for a TLS
(1.2) handshake. During the handshake, prior to establishing
the master secret, client and server automatically negotiate
the cipher suite parameters to be employed – as several
configurations are specified by the protocol.
TLS Record Layer. In a second phase, called the record
layer, the parameters and the symmetric key established by
the handshake layer are used to encrypt and decrypt data
(i.e. so-called records) sent from A to B, and vice-versa,
ensuring confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. This key
is used until the channel gets torn down or a maximum limit
of records have been exchanged. The maximum limit depends
on the algorithm. Beyond that point, should A and B need to
communicate securely again, a new handshake is performed.
TLS versus DTLS and ATLS. TLS was intially designed to
operate at the transport layer, on top of a transport protocol
that guarantees reliable and in-order delivery of data (typically
a TCP connection). TLS provided a widely adopted com-
munication security solution for connection-oriented transport
protocols but there was also a need to offer communciation
security for connectionless transports, such as UDP. The
resulting design was published as Datagram TLS (DTLS [31]).
The DTLS design intentionally makes as few modifications
to TLS as possible, which enables large code re-use. It was,
however, necessary to include enhancements to the handshake
protocol to detect message loss and duplication. It was also
necessary to add a DoS protection feature with an optional
cookie exchange. While TLS and DTLS are typically used on
top of the transport layer the protocol is flexible enough to
be applied to run over other layers in the protocol stack as
well. For instance, Application TLS (ATLS [10]) uses TLS
and DTLS over an application layer protocol, such as CoAP
or HTTP. In network access authentication TLS has been
encapsulated in the Extensible Authentication Protocol for use
over link layer protocols, such as IEEE 802.1X, and the AAA
infrastructure [1].
Other IoT Communication Security Approaches. Aside
of TLS and DTLS, alternative communication security
solutions have also emerged. The most prominent alternatives
targeting IoT are based on COSE [23] and OSCORE [25],
which aim at securing transferred data higher up in the
protocol stack, i.e. at the application layer and at the CoAP
layer, respectively.
Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is a signing and
encryption scheme which is conceptually similar to JavaScript
Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE). COSE can be used
in ”standalone” fashion to protect data transmitted over the
network. For instance, a COSE usecase is to protect a firmware
update binary (or more precisely, for signing metadata about
the firmware and, optionally, encrypting the firmware im-
age [33]). The COSE specification contains a range of security
primitives and application developers would most likely select
the mechanisms they are most interested in rather than using
the complete specification.
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OS-
CORE) reuses COSE to protect some (but not all) CoAP
headers and the CoAP payload.
Since OSCORE does not offer key management itself, it has to
rely on a separate key management protocol. Key management
protocols currently investigated in the IETF include Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC) and ATLS. EDHOC
rebuilds a handshake protocol based on COSE while ATLS
uses TLS and DTLS at the application layer.
Overhead & Performance of DTLS and TLS. Optimizing
the footprint of (D)TLS is important on low-end IoT devices.
For instance, our measurements show that, for a simple IoT
firmware using a 6LoWPAN/CoAP network stack, transport
layer security code adds up to 50% of the total binary
size (Flash memory), depending on the implementation and
the TLS configuration. In terms of RAM, some (D)TLS
configurations consume 20% of the total RAM usage of the
firmware.
TLS relies on heavy computations happening in the hand-
shake, based on assymmetric crypto. Hence, the less frequent
handshakes are, the better (subject to security still being
guaranteed). Comparatively, the record layer is triggered more
often, but incurs computations based on symmetric crypto
which are more lightweight.
As shown in Fig. 1, to complete the handshake, control data
exchanged by client and server requires several round-trip
times (RTT), thus incurring some delay and some commu-
nication overhead to setup the secure channel. Obviously, the
quicker the handshake is over, with the less bits transmitted,
and the less memory required, the better (subject to security
still being guaranteed).
DTLS/TLS 1.3 brings a number of qualitative improvements
over DTLS/TLS 1.2, which we overview next. A subsequent
question is: at which price come these improvements? We will
thus next compare DTLS/TLS 1.3 with DTLS/TLS 1.2 from
Fig. 1: Full TLS 1.2 Handshake. Notation: * optional field, []
piggybacked message not part of handshake per se.
a quantitative, performance point of view.
III. FROM TLS/DTLS 1.2 TO TLS/DTLS 1.3: AN
OVERVIEW
First we overview the breadth changes between TLS/DTLS
1.2 and TLS/DTLS 1.3. Then, we illustrate the handshake
protocols for TLS and DTLS, we illustrate the use of the
Connection ID, and explain improvements to the record layer
and discuss backward compatibility.
A. From TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3
Shorter Handshakes: The number of roundtrips have
been reduced. The newly introduced 0-RTT exchange allows
application data to be transmitted already with the first mes-
sage. As a result, replay protection cannot be offered by the
TLS layer for this so-called early data and it has to be provided
by the application layer. Using a regular exchange a client can
send application data after the first roundtrip. To convey the
necessary parameters for setting up the security context the
client has to add extra information to the ClientHello. The
reduction of latency is made possibly by making additional
assumptions about what knowledge the client has about the
server. It is assumed that the client knows the server, or at
least keeps some information about the server cached, and
configuration information (such as algorithms) rarely changes.
More Hurdles for Traffic Analysis: Privacy protection has
been improved by encrypting handshake messages as early as
possible. To make traffic analysis more difficult, record layer
padding was added.
Increased confidentiality protection is offered with the
mandatory use of perfect forward secrecy for public key-
based key exchange modes. As a consequence, the RSA key
transport mechanism was removed and this decision was met
with considerable skepticism by enterprise network operators
and firewall vendors since it limits their deep packet inspection
abilities.
Ciphersuites Cleanup: The ciphersuite concept was re-
visited: algorithm negotiation is untangled from the authenti-
cation and key exchange mechanism. The ciphersuite list was
cleaned-up as well.
The three modes based on pre-shared keys (PSK) present
in TLS 1.2, namely PSK-based ciphersuites, classical TLS
session resumption, and session resumption without server-
side state, have been merged into a single mode.
Support for Password-Authenticated Key Agreements
(PAKE)s, which were available in TLS/DTLS 1.2 with
SRP [27] and J-PAKE [8], were removed in TLS 1.3 1.
Authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) has
become the go-to-choice for symmetric encryption algorithms.
This decision reflects a trend in the TLS working group (and
in the industry in general) where other modes of operations
for ciphers have either been deprecated (such as RC4) or
discouraged (e.g. AES with CBC).
Revised Key Hierarchy: The key derivation algorithm
now makes use of the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF) construct defined in RFC
5869 [13] in a newly specified key hierarchy, which enables
a systematic analysis of the handshake using formal methods,
leveraging the independence of the different keys (see Section
7 of [17]). From an implementation point of view, this change
led to a larger code size compared to earlier TLS versions,
which used a relatively simple key hierarchy.
Changes Concerning Negotiation: Renegotiation was re-
defined with the introduction of a post-handshake authentica-
tion mechanism. Furthermore, version negotiation was ratio-
nalized.
Removed Functionalities: Custom Diffie-Hellman groups
were removed due to unnecessary complexity. Compression
functionality was removed because of attacks like CRIME,
TIME and BREACH [26].
B. From DTLS 1.2 to DTLS 1.3
DTLS 1.3 re-uses, like earlier versions, much of the TLS
1.3 handshake. There are, however, new features integrated
that did not exist in previous versions, such as the Connection
Identifier and the record layer format was heavily optimized.
The mechanism for ensuring the reliability of handshake
messages was also revisited to improve performance of the
handshake in networks with a high packet loss rate.
Connection Identifier (CID): In DTLS, the source IP
address and source port of the sender is used to identify a
security context. With CIDs a new identifier is carried in the
record layer of encrypted DTLS packets, which is used for the
lookup of established security state. With this extension an
established security context can be used significantly longer
without the need to re-run the full handshake or a resumption
handshake. This can lead to significant performance improve-
ments. CIDs are particularly useful in an IoT context where
1The Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) is currently conducting a
PAKE selection process and the integration of the PAKE algorithm into TLS
1.3 is one of the desirable features. Hence, it can be expected that sooner or
later a standardized PAKE algorithm will be available for use with TLS/DTLS
1.3.
Fig. 2: DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3: DoS Mitigation Technique.
devices sleep for extended time periods and likely run into
the problem of expired state at Network Address Translators
(NATs). Note that this extension has also been backported
to DTLS 1.2 [20] but the DTLS 1.2 CID solution it offers
different privacy characteristics.
Record Layer Optimization: Once the handshake com-
pletes, application data is protected using the established keys.
Every payload is wrapped inside a record layer structure. To
reduce the overhead of the record layer structure, the DTLS 1.3
specification introduced a variable length format and removed
or shortened several fields. A sequence number encryption
scheme has been added to improve privacy protection by
limiting the ability correlation by an on-path adversary.
Redefined Retransmission Mechanism: Prior to DTLS 1.3
the retransmission granularity was at the level of an entire
flight, i.e. a series of message. In DTLS 1.3 an explicit ACK
message has been added allowing the explicit acknowledge-
ment of individual handshake messages.
DoS Protection with TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest: DTLS
1.2 [19] required an enhancement of the handshake for denial
of service protection to avoid reflection attacks and resource
exhaustion on the server side. This is accomplished via the
introduction of a dedicated message in earlier versions of
DTLS, namely the HelloVerifyRequest. In DTLS 1.3 this
message has been replaced by the HelloRetryRequest since
this message has already been introduced in TLS 1.3, as shown
in Fig. 2.
C. TLS 1.3 Handshake Analysis
In the rest of this section we use the following notation
borrowed from the TLS 1.3 specification: ‘+ indicates a
noteworthy extension’, ‘*’ refers to an optional message orex-
tension, ‘[]’, ‘()’, and ‘{}’ show encrypted messages whereby
the keys used to encrypt these messages differ.
Fig. 3: TLS 1.3 Public Key based Authentication.
When comparing the TLS 1.2 with the TLS 1.3 handshake it
is obvious that a few messages have been removed, namely the
ServerHelloDone, the ChangeCipherSpec, the ServerKeyEx-
change, and the ClientKeyExchange. In the TLS 1.2 hand-
shake the Finished message is the first (and only) encrypted
handshake message. The contents of the ServerKeyExchange
and ClientKeyExchange messages varies with the negotiated
authentication and key exchange method. With TLS 1.3 its
content has been moved to extensions in the ClientHello and
ServerHello messages. The ServerHelloDone and the Change-
CipherSpec messages were removed without replacement.
Looking at TLS 1.3 the public key-based authentication
mode is probably the most important and it is shown in
Figure 3. It always uses perfect forward secrecy using an
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Figure 3 shows the exten-
sions in the ClientHello that have to be used with this mode.
Application data is already sent by the client after the first
roundtrip and the EncryptedExtensions provides confidential-
ity protection of many of the extensions carried in the Server-
Hello in earlier versions of TLS. If mutual authentication is
desired, which is common in IoT deployments, then the server
uses the CertificateRequest message. The Certificate, Certifi-
cateVerify and the Finished message have kept their semantic
of earlier TLS versions. Size-wise the biggest payloads in
this exchange are the Diffie-Hellman public keys exchanged
between the two parties and the certificates.
The pre-shared key (PSK) authentication mode is shown
in Figure 4 and it optionally uses a Diffie-Hellman ex-
change (with the Diffie-Hellman public keys conveyed in
the key share extension). This mode harmonizes three PSK
variants available in previous TLS versions into one. The
pre shared key extension in the ClientHello signals the use
of the PSK mode and contains the PSK identity and the so-
called binder. The PSK identity identifies the shared secret
and the binder is a structure that contains one or multiple
Fig. 4: TLS 1.3 Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Authentication.
MAC values. Application data is already sent by the client
after the first roundtrip. In this mode many of the messages
shown in the public key-based mode are missing. In general,
this mode is computationally much less demanding, leads to
shorter message sizes, and requires less code size because in
the simplest configuration it does not require any asymmetric
crypto operations.
The 0-RTT mode, shown in Figure 5, allows a client to
send application data, called early data, already with the first
message. This mode represents a new feature in TLS 1.3 and
does not have an equivalent in earlier TLS versions. It does,
however, introduce the risk of replay attacks and an application
is therefore required to check for replay attacks. The use of
early data likely requires API extensions in the embedded TLS
stack. The 0-RTT mode makes use of a PSK established in
an earlier exchange (or an externally configured PSK) and
can therefore be seen as an optimized version of the PSK
authentication mode.
Table I shows a ranking of the authentication modes in-
dicating when the client send application data and what the
expected over-the-wire message size is. Note that there is a
tradeoff between over-the-wire performance, functionality and
code size/RAM utilization: smaller packet sizes are typically
accomplished with extra performance optimizations, which
either require more complex code or additional RAM (or in
some cases both). Note that some of the extensions developed
for earlier TLS versions can still be used with TLS 1.3, such
as raw public keys (RPKs) [32] and TLS cached info [22].
These extensions have not been taken into account during the
performance measurement and hence there is room for further
optimizations.
D. DTLS 1.3 Backward Compatibility
Introducing protocol changes to improve efficiency is rel-
atively easy from an engineering point of view until the
Fig. 5: TLS 1.3 0-RTT Data.
Mode App data can be sent Data Size
PK mode (+ X.509 certs) after 1st RT ++++
PK mode (+ RPKs) after 1st RT +++
PSK (+PFS) after 1st RT ++
Plain PSK after 1st RT +
0-RTT with 1st msg +
TABLE I: Performance of the different TLS 1.3 authentication
modes.
deployment reality settles in. Engineers have been exposed to
protocol ossification, which is the result of software and hard-
ware deployed in the middle of the network. Unfortunately, it
also impacted the design of TLS 1.3 in a subtle way. With the
changes to various handshake messages TLS 1.3 deployment
experiments have shown problems with failed connection
attempts and even with blacklisted IP addresses resulting from
misbehaving firewalls and intrusion detection systems. As a
consequence, the TLS working group descided to modify TLS
1.3 at a large stage in the standardization process such that
it looks on the wire like TLS 1.2 session resumption. This
required the newly introduced HelloRetryRequest message to
look like the ServerHello message (which is bigger on the
wire), and to exchange fake ChangeCipherSpec messages.
Luckily, DTLS 1.3 does not suffer from the same level of
ossification and changes to the handshake messages and even
to the record layer are still possible to deploy.
E. DTLS 1.3 Record Layer
The TLS 1.3 Record Layer format has changed to offer
better privacy protection (and due to backwards compatibility
reasons) by faking the outermost content type and protocol
version fields. Figure 6 shows the nested structure with the
true content type value encapsulated inside the encrypted
payload. Note also the additional zero byte padding following
the plaintext content.
Fig. 6: TLS 1.3 Record Layer Structure.
Fig. 7: DTLS 1.3 Ciphertext Structure.
In contrast, the DTLS 1.3 record layer structure has been
highly optimized with a variable length encoding. The new
structure is shown in Figure 7 the Connection ID, and Length
field being optional. The presence or absence of the fields as
well as the length of the sequence number is controlled by
bitmask. In the most minimalistic case the DTLS 1.3 record
layer only contains the 8 bit long bitmask, 8 bits of sequence
numbers followed by the encrypted record whereby in this case
the length information has to be retrieved from the underlying
transport layer.
F. Summary of Protocol Comparison
Comparing TLS/DTLS 1.3 to 1.2, the list of new features
and changes is quite long. The primary improvements we
observe, protocol-wise, in 1.3 compared to 1.2, are in terms
of:
• added security guarantees, and
• minimized setup delay until the point where application
data can first be sent.
Nevertheless, taking account all of the changes (also in-
cluding feature removals), it is not straightforward to gauge
the impact of such changes on performance metrics such as
code size on micro-controllers, the overall required amount of
cryptographic operations, or the total control data overhead.
Towards a more precise assessment, the next sections thus
present experiments we carried out on IoT hardware.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we provide an overview of our experimental
setup.
IoT Hardware Setup: Our experiments were carried out
on three Arm Cortex M-based IoT devices:
• the nRF52840-DK uses a commercially available Arm
Cortex-M4 microcontroller from Nordic Semiconductor,
which has a generous 1MB of Flash memory and 256kB
of RAM. This was our primary hardware.
• the IoT-Lab M3 Node uses a custom-designed devel-
opment board that includes a Arm Cortex-M3 micro-
controller from STMicroelectronics, which has 512kB
of Flash memory and 64kB of RAM, and utilizes the
STM32F103REY MCU. This board has been developed
for the open access testbed FIT IoT-Lab [2]. This board
was used to determine the impact of the use of a Cortex
M3 on the flash footprint.
• the Keil MCBSTM32F400 evaluation board is
based on an Arm Cortex-M4 from STMicroelectronics
(STM32F407IG), which has 1MB of Flash memory and
192 kB of RAM. This board was used to verify the flash,
heap, and energy measurements.
For reliable measurements of the communication we used
6LoWPAN over Ethernet over serial.
Software and Network Setup: We provide the first imple-
mentation of DTLS 1.3 targeting low-power microcontrollers,
open source published at [30]. For our setup, we used RIOT [3]
as the real-time operating system in version 2019.10, which
includes networking middleware. Our setup uses two RIOT
nodes communicating via a 6LoWPAN/CoAP protocol stack,
including support for different DTLS/TLS libraries and con-
figurations.
Leveraging these software foundations, we then evaluate
different configurations, namely:
• TLS/DTLS protocol versions: TLS 1.2 and 1.3, DTLS
1.2 and 1.3;
• authentication and key exchange profiles: PSK-based
authentication and AES128/AES256 on one hand, and
profiles with ECDSA-ECDHE-based authentication (us-
ing the NIST curves) and AES128/AES256 on the other
hand;
• key size variations: symmetric cryptography with 128-
bit and 256-bit for AES and the corresponding key size
for
ECDHE/ECDSA with NIST P256r1 and P521r1 curves.
• embedded TLS/DTLS stack implementations: we use
open source implementations from WolfSSL (version
4.4.0), and Mbed TLS (version 2.16), as well as our own
TLS/DTLS 1.3 implementation.
We wrote an application to test the different configurations
and the code is published at [21] for reproduceability. Our
application uses TLS and DTLS on top of CoAP, as specified
in [10]. Securing the communication channel end-to-end
above CoAP is indeed a trend in IoT, as also demonstrated
by alternative standards such as OSCORE [25]. We thus
chose this configuration as it gives a good base to pit variants
of TLS and DTLS both against one another, and with such
alternatives (in future work).
To perform our energy measurements, we primarily used the
Nordic nRF6707 power profiling kit, which was designed to
work with the nRF52840-DK. The measurement captures the
entire protocol exchange, including RTOS handling, network
communication, processing by the networking stack, as well
as the entire TLS/DTLS handshake. We start the measurement
when the first packet is sent out to initiate the TLS/DTLS
handshake and stop it when we close the TLS/DTLS hand-
shake. Because we use ATLS, the CoAP transmission as our
transport for TLS/DTLS is included in the energy measure-
ments. For verification of the measurements we also used
the Keil ULINK plus together with the MCBSTM32F400
evaluation board.
On the IoT-Lab M3 Node and on the nRF52840-DK we uti-
lized the GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain (9-2020-q2-update)
with GCC 9.3.1. The compiler has been configured to optimize
for code size. For the Keil MCBSTM32F400 we used the Keil
uVision 5 IDE in version 5.26.2.0. As a compiler we used
Arm Compiler version 5 with the highest optimization level
(level 3). The linker was configured with data compression
disabled. We used a scatter file to influence the placement of
the different components in RAM and flash memory.
Metrics: To comparatively evaluate the protocols and
their implementations, we measure the required (i) stack and
heap size, (ii) code size, (iii) over-the-wire network traffic
overhead, and (iv) energy consumption.
While the absolute numbers are important they ignore
the flexibility of embedded TLS stacks whereby the crypto
algorithms can be optimized, or replaced by another software
implementation. In some cases, depending on the capabil-
ity of the hardware, the TLS stack can also make use of
crypto accelerators in hardware. Note that we did not utilize
hardware crypto acceleration provided by the nRF52840-DK.
Prior work, such as [33], investigates different embedded
crypto libraries and noted the tradeoffs made by different
implementations. Hence, we have included tests with different
TLS/DTLS implementations.
1.2 1.3 Diff
TLS with PSK, AES-128-CCM 19004 23988 4,984
TLS with PSK, AES-256-GCM 22942 28696 5,754
TLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 46892 53023 6,131
TLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-256-GCM 54312 61149 6,837
DTLS with PSK, AES-128-CCM 22338 28136 5,798
DTLS with PSK, AES-256-GCM 27320 33894 6,574
DTLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 50532 58097 7,565
DTLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-256-GCM 57972 66215 8,243
TABLE II: DTLS/TLS 1.2 vs. DTLS/TLS 1.3 Flash Size (with
Mbed TLS on Arm Cortex-M4).
1.2 1.3 Diff
TLS with PSK, AES-128-CCM 337 380 43
TLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 1308 1371 63
TLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-256-CCM 1454 1415 -39
DTLS with PSK, AES-128-CCM 627 467 -160
DTLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 1726 1500 -226
DTLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-256-CCM 1879 1542 -337
TABLE III: Bytes-Over-The Air, measured using Mbed TLS.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Based on the measurements we present below, we aim to
provide some answers to questions that either a specialist, or
a neophyte would ask.
A. Impact of protocol versions
What is the impact of upgrading from 1.2 to 1.3 on resource
requirements?
Memory footprint.: Table II shows the Flash memory
footprint using the Mbed TLS stack. Compared to versions
1.2, these measurements indicate 20% increase with TLS /
DTLS 1.3. Further measurements on the RAM shown below
in Table V indicate no significant impact on stack require-
ments, and limited impact on peak heap footprint (max 25%
increase for some configurations in one implementation, and
for the other implentation, even 30% decrease, for ECDHE
configurations). Our conclusion is that TLS/DTLS 1.3 does
not require a substantial amount of additional flash and heap
compared to TLS/DTLS 1.2. Hence, developers can benefit
from (D)TLS 1.3 protocol improvements without the need to
upgrade hardware.
Bytes over the air.: Table III shows some measurements
of bytes-over-the air, for various configurations of (D)TLS 1.2
and 1.3. We observe that:
• for TLS, slighlty increased ( 10% more) bytes-over-the-
air, except for PSK AES-256-GCM (+23%);
• for DTLS with PSK decreased bytes-over-the-air ( 25%
less);
• for DTLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, decreased bytes-over-
the-air ( 15% less).
Based on these measurements, we conclude that, for DTLS
1.3 we see a slight decrease of over-the-air overhead, most
likely due due to the protocol’s record layer optimizations, and
a slight increase for TLS 1.3 (overall: max 25% difference).
1.2 1.3 Diff
Mbed TLS - TLS with PSK, AES-128-CCM 2.7 2.3 0.4
Mbed TLS - TLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 89.6 63.4 -26.2
Mbed TLS - DTLS with PSK, AES-128-CCM 2.0 5.3 3.3
Mbed TLS - DTLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 87.5 73.3 -14.2
WolfSSL - TLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 76.3 77.5 1.2
WolfSSL - DTLS with PSK, AES-128-CCM 1.9 N/A N/A
WolfSSL - DTLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 77.0 N/A N/A
TABLE IV: Energy Measurements (Millicoulomb).
Energy consumption.: TLS 1.3 can lead to an energy
reduction, as shown in Table IV. The most interesting aspect
we observe here is the huge difference between symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography: while there is some communication
overhead due to the 6LoWPAN protocol stack, the PSK-based
exchange consumes a fraction of the energy of a corresponding
TLS/DTLS handshake with ECDHE-ECDSA. Hence, it is
advisable to avoid using a full ECDHE-ECDSA exchange and
instead make use of session resumption or even CID-based
exchanges.
Let us nevertheless add a remark on the increase in energy
consumption for DTLS 1.2 to 1.3 with PSK-AES-128-CCM,
from 2.0 to 5.3 uC. This can be explained by the absence
of a feature implemented in the 1.2 version of DTLS, see
Mbed TLS version 2.13 [15], that allows multiple DTLS
records to be packed into a single datagram (or CoAP message
in our case). This reduces the bytes transmitted over the
wire considerably because the underlying layers add a lot of
header overhead. Needless to say that this feature will also be
implemented in the DTLS 1.3 stack in the near future given
its benefits.
B. Impact of implementation
We were curious as to how different implementations may
lead to different tradeoffs. To explore this aspect, we ex-
amin more precisely different implementations: WolfSSL and
mbedTLS.
On one hand, we measured that both implementations
consistently require more Flash memory for 1.3 compared
to 1.2 (approcimately 20% more). However, the impact on
RAM usage seems to vary depending on the implementation,
as shown in Table V.
This data suggests that there is probably room left for
optimizations in the implementations. In fact, an optimized
version of Mbed TLS exists, as for instance [5] which lowers
the RAM requirements down to less than 10 Kb for DTLS with
ECDHE-ECDSA with AES-128-CCM by using a different
crypto library (TinyCrypt), combined with a more efficient
management of send and receive buffers, as well as an im-
proved handling of certificates and of the DTLS retransmission
buffers.
Let us conclude the study of this aspect with two important
lessons learnt:
• Our experience is that it is quite hard to configue dif-
ferent libraries exactly the same way according to
protocol specifications. In particular, we noticed some
MbedTLS Heap MbedTLS Stack WolfSSL Heap WolfSSL Stack
TLS 1.2 PSK AES-128-CCM 5749 8772 3496 12
TLS 1.2 ECC AES-128-CCM 13879 8786 7162 12
TLS 1.2 ECC AES-256-GCM 20603 8780 7922 12
TLS 1.3 PSK AES-128-CCM 6757 8764 6224 12
TLS 1.3 ECC AES-128-CCM 12914 8778 9458 12
TLS 1.3 ECC AES-256-GCM 14366 8780 10250 12
DTLS 1.2 PSK AES-128-CCM 5975 8772 5340 12
DTLS 1.2 ECC AES-128-CCM 14414 8786 8540 12
DTLS 1.3 PSK AES-128-CCM 6934 8764 N/A N/A
DTLS 1.3 ECC AES-128-CCM 13248 8778 N/A N/A
TABLE V: Required RAM in Bytes (Peak Heap & Stack) for
MbedTLS and WolfSSL.
1.2 Flash 1.3 Flash 1.2 Stack 1.3 Stack
TLS with PSK, AES-128-CCM 18938 22912 8772 8764
TLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 46752 52867 8786 8778
DTLS with PSK, AES-128-CCM 22278 28122 8772 8764
DTLS with ECDHE-ECDSA, AES-128-CCM 50394 57973 8786 8778
TABLE VI: Flash & Stack memory requirements on Arm
Cortex-M3 (with Mbed TLS).
minor difference in bytes over the wire with the dif-
ferent implementations, which we could not completely
eliminate, although we tried our best. Understanding
which configuration setting lead to the desired resource
utilization tradeoffs tends to be tricky.
• Depending on the selected crypto library RAM and flash
memory requirements vary substantially, as shown in [33]
and in optimization efforts like [5].
C. Impact of underlying hardware
Are there differences between microcontrollers?: As
shown in Table VI there are no significant code size differences
on the different the development boards we used. Performance-
wise there are, however, differences between microcontrollers
as they differ in their speed. While crypto code could make
use of certain features of microcontrollers, such as the caching
capabilities of the Cortex M7 processor, those optimizations
are rarely utilized by developers because require a detailed
understanding of the processor architecture, expertise in cryp-
tography and time to develop optimized algorithm implemen-
tations. It is therefore more likely for developers to make
use of the provided hardware crypto acceleration even though
we did not update the code to feed it into our tests. Note
that there are dedicated benchmarks focused on measuring the
performance of MCUs, see [29].
Note: Fig. V indicates that all configurations of Mbed TLS
require an 8 kB stack. This is the result of configuration
settings for the AES library where developers can decide
whether they want to use more RAM and/or flash for the
benefit of improved performance. In our configuration we
decided not to place the tables in flash nor to use smaller
tables. Hence, we are experiencing a hit on the stack size.
Setting the configuration option for smaller tables cuts the
stack size requirement down to 2600 bytes.
Availability of hardware crypto support.: We did not
do any measurments to illustrate this point because available
hardware crypto is typically not supported out-of-the-box by
popular implementations. However, making good use of such
hardware capabilities could change the equation. The EEMBC
PSK AES128 PSK AES256 ECDHE AES128 ECDHE AES256
TLS 1.2 19kB 24kB 46kB 54kB
TLS 1.3 23kB 28kB 53kB 61kB
TABLE VII: Flash memory requirements for mbedTLS on an
ARM Cortex-M4.
published SecureMark-TLS benchmark [28] tried to answer
the question about the performance of IoT hardware with and
without hardware crypto support.
D. Impact of crypto suite
Differences between PSK and ECDHE.: To no surprise,
the overhead of ECDHE compared to PSK is big. But how
big? Fig. VII shows ECDHE needs approx. 30 kB more Flash
memory, which means an increase of roughly 100% in code
size compared to PSK.
In terms of RAM, measurements shown Fig. V indicate for
instance that TLS 1.2 with ECDHE-ECDSA AES-256 peaks
at 15kB more (which means roughly 3.5 times more heap
required) compared to TLS1.2 with PSK AES-128, with the
MbedTLS implementation.
Last but not least, in terms of energy, measurements shown
Table IV indicate that DTLS 1.2 with ECDHE-ECDSA AES-
128 burns more than 40 times more energy compared to DTLS
1.2 with PSK AES-128 (measured with Mbed TLS).
Next Fig. 8 breaks down the relative flash memory footprint
per component, for TLS 1.3 PSK with AES-128-CCM. Note
that the code size needed for symmetric crypto is almost as
large as the code size for the TLS protocol itself! Hence, the
crypto libraries in use (and the cipher suite) have a major
impact on the (D)TLS footprint, which should not be under-
estimated. More in detail, we distinguish four components: (i)
HKDF code, to provide this functionality as specified in RFC
5869 and in the TLS 1.3 specification, (ii) the Random Num-
ber Generation (RNG), (iii) Symmetric crypto code, which
includes SHA256, AES, CCM, and the wrapper functions for
more convenient use of cryptographic primitives, and finally
(iv) TLS code, including the client-side code and code shared
by both client- and server-side, as well as code for managing
ciphersuites.
In comparison, Fig. 9 shows that this footprint changes
substantially for ECDHE with AES-128-CCM. In this con-
figuration more than 70% of the memory footprint is taken
by crypto (among which 50% for asymmetric crypto alone,
counting also X.509). More in detail, we distinguish two
additional components compared to Fig. 8, namely: (v) asym-
metric crypto code, including code for the bignum library and
functionalities needed for ECC, ECDSA, ECDHE, and (vi)
X.509 code, including ASN1 libraries, public key processing
functions and various support functions.
Differences between AES128/256, SHA256/384, bigger
curves.: Based on our aformentioned measurements we ob-
serve that the differences between these cipher suites are
• negligible concerning Flash footprint;







Fig. 8: Relative sizes of Flash memory per component, for












Fig. 9: Relative sizes of Flash memory per component, for
TLS 1.3 ECDSA-ECDHE (P2561) with AES-128-CCM.
• major in terms of energy consumption.
Differences between CCM and GCM.: Based on our
measurements, we observe that the main impact of GCM
versus CCM is in RAM footprint (i.e. in terms peak heap
demand).
E. Impact of the protocol
A surprising observation is the relatively small difference
in terms of bytes-over-the-air with DTLS compared to TLS,
in particular for ECC. This is especially surprising because
DTLS is the traditional solution on low-power wireless, where
”every sent byte counts”. A big contributor to the total size
of the exchanged data are certificates, particularly since we
use mutual authentication. Even though we use ECC-based
certificates their size can be rather large depending on the
content of the certificate and the hierarchy used by the PKI.
This aspect has already been recognized in the standardization
community and several extensions have been developed or
are in development. Unfortunately, those extensions have not
found their way into embedded TLS/DTLS stacks.
VI. DISCUSSION & FUTURE WORK
Due to its flexibility, various credential types and extensions
can be used with TLS and DTLS. We focused our investi-
gations on PSKs and certificate-based authentication. Quite
naturally, PSK-based authentication is superior to certificate-
based authentication from a performance point of view. To
our surprise, the energy measurements indicate a dramatically
lower energy consumption than certificate-based authentica-
tion. Particularly when combining DTLS with the newly
developed connection ID feature an existing DTLS session
can be kept alive for a long time and the need for repeated
handshakes can be avoided.
Our measurements did not take advantage of hardware
security features available in many microcontrollers available
on the market today. When using these hardware accellerators
a significantly lower flash size, RAM utilization, and better
energy efficiency can be excepted. It is particularly surprising
that the crypto-related software components constitute a sig-
nificant portion of the overall code size. For a certificate-based
TLS configuration, the size of the TLS handshake-related code
is small.
While embedded TLS/DTLS stacks are on the market for
a long time already, we can still observe further optimization
possibilities on the code level, and various extensions are de-
veloped for TLS/DTLS to reduce other parts of the handshake,
particularly certificate-related compression schemes (X.509
certificates are still a major contributor to the over-the-air
transmission overhead and to increasing heap utilization).
Thus, our observation is that optimal performance of DTLS
and TLS 1.3 on microcontrollers is still to be determined.
And consequently, comparing this performance to that of other
solutions (e.g. based on OSCORE and EDHOC) is future
work.
On the one hand, EDHOC specification is also work-in-
progress. Maturation of this solution is expected to hap-
pen next within the newly formed IETF working group
LAKE [12]. On the other hand hand, work aiming to min-
imize TLS/DTLS 1.3 footprint is currently in early stages
of development in the TLS working group and needs futher
evaluation down the line, in order to gauge its full potential.
Recent work has started to focus on minimizing communi-
cation security footprint. For instance, cTLS (Compact TLS
1.3 [18]) proposes a configuration of TLS 1.3 which sacrifices
backwards compability for significant savings in over-the-wire
size. This effort leverages both aggressive use of a more
compact encoding, and the use of default values for TLS
configurations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Communication security is a key part of securing IoT
devices. While TLS and DTLS 1.2 protocols have become
typical solutions in this context, TLS 1.3 has recently been
published and DTLS 1.3 publication is imminent.
Compared to 1.2, version 1.3 of the protocols provides
a number of improvements, including fewer preliminary
roundtrips, better privacy protection, and a more modern
crypto design.
In this paper, we have provided an overview of TLS / DTLS
1.3 compared to TLS / DTLS 1.2, via a detailed protocol study
comparing many options. We also provide a quick overview
of on-going related efforts towards minimizing the footprint
of communication security above the transport layer. As such,
this paper provide a useful guide for newcomers in this space.
Next, we have conducted an experimental comparative
evaluation pf these protocols with respect to stack and heap
size, code size, over-the-wire network traffic overhead, and
energy consumption through measurements we carried out on
commercially available low-power microcontrollers.
We show that TLS and DTLS 1.3 improvements are accom-
plished with only small overhead in Flash memory and RAM
requirements, compared to TLS/DTLS 1.2.
As such this paper provides a useful set of data points for
a knowledgeable practitioner in this space, to quickly grasp
potential issues and make the appropriate choices in terms of
IoT software and hardware platform.
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